specify the model in terms of changes from the current equilibrium. This approach allows us to calibrate the model from existing data on production and trade shares. We thereby …nesse having to assemble proxies for bilateral resistance (e.g., distance, common language, etc.) or inferring parameters of technology. A particular virtue is that we do not have to impose the symmetry in bilateral trade ‡ows implied by these measures but spurned by the data. China, for example, runs the largest bilateral surplus with the United States, while running substantial de…cits with some of her Asian neighbors, Japan in particular.
Our approach recognizes and incorporates these bilateral asymmetries.
Our earlier work considered the e¤ect of eliminating current account de…cits in a world in which factors could seamlessly move between manufacturing and other activities. While this assumption might apply to the very long run, it probably fails to capture barriers to internal factor mobility that are likely to loom large for some time. Here we pursue the opposite extreme of treating factors as …xed in either manufacturing or nonmanufacturing activity. For comparison purposes we present our results for the case of perfect factor mobility as well.
In either case we allow adjustment to take the form of changes in the range of goods that countries exchange (the extensive margin) as well as changes in the amounts of each good traded (the intensive margin). But adjustment at the extensive margin may take time.
Hence, to capture very short run e¤ects we consider a case in which both the allocation of labor and the extensive margin are …xed.
Both this paper and our previous one return to a venerable topic, the potential for a secondary burden of a transfer. A question we can answer is the extent to which the elimination of the giant U.S. current account de…cit entails a loss in real resources beyond the loss of the transfer itself. Our model recognizes the importance of nontradability, so that it delivers Keynes'prediction that the elimination of a transfer entails a worsened terms of trade. But since our model also incorporates nontraded goods whose prices decline, the burden of paying more for imports is almost entirely o¤set by the bene…t of cheaper nontraded goods. Our numbers thus come down on the side of Ohlin: The elimination of the transfer entails a loss in real absorption of virtually the same magnitude. 3 This prediction emerges under either extreme assumption about factor mobility. But factor immobility introduces a major additional consideration: The internal redistribution of income implied by global rebalancing. We …nd that, with resource immobility, eliminating the current account de…cit raises the returns to U.S. factors working in manufacturing to those working elsewhere by about 24 percent. Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2005) also employ a static trade model to examine the implications of eliminating current account imbalances. Their focus is on real exchange rates and the terms of trade, rather than real wages and welfare, our interest here. They employ a highly-symmetric three-region model. With labor mobility our results are closest to what Obstfeld and Rogo¤ call a "very gradual" unwinding, or a decade-long adjustment, while labor immobility connects better with their more drastic scenarios. 4 3 While our framework can quite handily deal with a multitude of countries, its analytic essence derives from the two-country model of trade and unilateral transfers of Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977) . 4 Corsetti, Martin, and Pesenti (2007) develop a symmetric two-country model in which adjustment can take place across two goods margins, the intensive and extensive. They examine the long-run consequences of the e¤ects of improving net export de…cits of 6.5 percent of GDP in one country to a balanced position.
In the version of the model in which all adjustment takes place at the intensive margin, the authors …nd that closing the external imbalance requires a fall in long-run consumption (of the country undergoing the adjustment) by around 6 percent and a depreciation of the real exchange rate, and the terms of trade by 17 percent and 22 percent, respectively. When adjustment can also occur at the extensive margin, there is a much smaller depreciation in the real exchange rate, and in the terms of trade, of 1.1 percent and 6.4
We proceed as follows: Section 1 speci…es a world model of production and trade in manufactures, allowing for both perfect immobility and perfect mobility. How we calibrate this model to data on production and trade shares is the topic of Section 2. Sections 3 reports our results for various cases and Section 4 concludes.
A Model of the World
We consider a world of i = 1; : : : ; N countries. Country i is endowed with labor L i . 5 Labor is allocated between two sectors, manufacturing
Throughout we assume that all production is at constant returns to scale and that all markets are perfectly competitive. 
Income and Expenditure: Some Accounting
We relate production and trade in manufactures to aggregate income, expenditure, and wages. We have to do some accounting to draw these connections.
We denote country i's gross production of manufactures as Y
M i
of which a share i is value-added. With perfect competition, value added corresponds to factor payments respectively. The changes in consumption, and welfare, under the two versions of the model, however, are similar. 5 To generalize our analysis to incorporate multiple factors of production one may think of L i as a vector of factors. 6 See Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2008) to see how the model could be respeci…ed in terms of monopolistic competition with heterogeneous …rms, as in Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008) . There are no essential di¤erences for the conclusions we draw here.
is the manufacturing wage.
Similarly, w N i is the nonmanufacturing wage, so that nonmanufacturing value added is
and GDP is
If we de…ne the average wage as
We make the standard assumption of "iceberg"trade barriers, implying that to deliver one unit of a manufactured good from country i to country n requires shipping d ni 1 units, where we normalize d ii = 1. Thus, delivering a unit of good j produced in country i to country n incurs a unit cost:
Ricardian Specialization
As in Eaton and Kortum (2002) country i's e¢ ciency z i (j) in making good j is the realization of a random variable Z with distribution:
which is drawn independently across i: Here T i > 0 is a parameter that re ‡ects country i's overall e¢ ciency in producing any good and is an inverse measure of the dispersion of e¢ ciencies. The implied distribution of p ni (j) is:
Buyers in destination n will buy each manufacturing good j from the cheapest source at a price:
The distribution G n (p) of prices paid in country n is
where:
The probability ni that country i is the cheapest source is its share of this sum:
Invoking the law of large numbers, this probability becomes the measure of goods that country n purchases from country i. Thus ni is a bilateral trade share measured by numbers of goods. To obtain a trade share measured by expenditures we must specify demand.
Demand for Manufactures
We assume that the individual manufacturing goods, whether used as intermediates or in …nal demand, combine with constant elasticity > 0. Spending in country n on good j is therefore
where p n is the the manufacturing price index in country n; which appeared previously in expression (7) for the cost of an input bundle.
We compute the price index by integrating over the prices of individual goods:
and is the gamma function, requiring > 1.
We can express bilateral trade shares in expenditure terms mechanically as:
where X M ni is average spending per good in country n on goods purchased from i.
To compute X M ni we need to know the distribution G ni (p) of the prices of goods that country n buys from country i since:
As shown in Eaton and Kortum (2002) , among the goods that n buys from i, the distribution of prices is the same regardless of source, so that we can write
n and hence (10) becomes:
The two measures of the bilateral trade share reduce to the same thing.
Trade Elasticities
How do trade shares and prices respond to changes in input costs around the world? Say that the costs of input bundles in each country k move from c k to c We …rst consider the case in which a buyer can switch to any new source country that can deliver a good more cheaply. The resulting bilateral trade shares are:
The parameter determining how changes in costs translate into trade shares is , which re ‡ects the extent of heterogeneity in production e¢ ciency. It captures how changes in costs bring about a change in international specialization in production and delivery to various markets, the extensive margin.
We also need to consider how price indices adjust to a change in costs around the world.
Starting from (9), with the extensive margin active, the price index resulting from a change in costs is
Note that is nowhere to be seen.
Say instead that after input costs change, countries are stuck buying each good from the same source as before, so that adjustment is only in how much is spent on each good, the intensive margin. To see what happens to trade shares, return to equation (10), this time shutting down the extensive margin by …xing the nk 's. The price of any good that country n had bought from country i at price p now costs pb c i : If country n goes on buying each good from its original source, the resulting bilateral trade shares (with a superscript SR to denote the short-run) are:
Since we started with a situation in which country n bought every good from the lowest cost source, so that G ni (p) = G n (p); the resulting trade shares simplify to:
The parameter now determining how changes in costs translate into trade shares becomes 1, as in the Armington model. Since > 1, the e¤ective trade elasticity is lower when we shut down the extensive margin.
Parallel to (12) above, we also need an expression for the change in the price index in each country that results from a change in input costs. To derive this expression, recall that we can construct the price index from source-speci…c blocks:
Therefore, in response to a change in costs: ( 1) : (14) The elasticity 1 again replaces as the relevant parameter when we shut down the extensive margin. In all other ways, the analysis is exactly parallel.
We will return to this result in our simulations where we interpret 1 as the shortterm trade elasticity. This interpretation is motivated by the dynamic 2-country analysis of Ruhl (2005) in which …rms choose not to adjust their extensive margin in response to temporary ‡uctuations in costs. In this case, all adjustment takes place via expenditure per good resulting from changes in prices and incomes.
Equilibrium
The conditions for equilibrium in world manufactures are:
This set of equations determines relative wages across countries. To see how, plug in the expressions above for manufacturing production (5) and absorption (6) to get
We obtain an expression for the trade shares by substituting (7) into (11):
From (7) and (9), the price index for manufactures is:
The size of the non-manufacturing sector (and hence of the manufacturing sector) is nailed down by:
World equilibrium is a set of wages and prices w (1), (2), (16), (17), (18), and (19) given parameters including labor endowments and de…cits,
To complete the description of equilibrium, we have to take a stand on labor mobility.
We consider the two extremes of internal labor market mobility. In the mobile labor case, which we take as re ‡ecting the long run, the wage equilibrates between sectors, so that w Our counterfactual experiments calculate the response of all endogenous variables to an exogenous change in de…cits around the world.
Quanti…cation
We now turn to how we quantify the model.
Data
We created our sample of 42 countries as follows. We began with the …fty largest as measured by GDP in 2000, and combined the others into a "country"labeled ROW. Incomplete data forced us to move Saudi Arabia, Poland, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Puerto Rico, and the Czech Republic into ROW as well. Because of peculiarities in the data suggestive of entrepôt trade, which our approach here is ill-equipped to handle, we combined (1) Belgium and Luxembourg (which we pulled out of ROW), (2) China and Hong Kong, and (3) Malaysia, Philippines, and Singapore into single entities. The result is 42 entities, which we refer to as countries, that constitute the entire world.
To solve for the counterfactual, we need data on GDP (for Y i ), manufacturing value added (for V 
The overall trade de…cit in goods and services D i and current account de…cits CA i ; used for our counterfactual experiments below, are from the IMF (2006). We calculate total …nal spending as
Our handling of production and bilateral trade in manufactures is more involved. Our 9 We have to confront the problem that the data imply nonzero current account and trade balances for the world as a whole. Our procedures can't explain this discrepancy so we allocated the de…cits to countries in proportion to their GDP's. Since we use only importer data to measure bilateral trade in manufactures, 
With our bilateral trade matrix, we can calculate the trade de…cit in manufactures,
Except for the numbers used to calculate i ; all data are for 2004, the most recent year for which we could get complete data.
Calibration
In principle, computing the world equilibrium requires knowing the parameters d ni ; i ; We set = 8:28; the central value Eaton and Kortum (2002) report based on crosscountry product-level price data. We also report the implications of our short-run approach, replacing with 1. There are a wide range of estimates of . BEJK (2003) Using (3) and (4), we calculate i as: 
Counterfactual De…cits
Our counterfactual is a world in which production and trade in manufactures has adjusted to eliminate all current account imbalances. Not modeling nonmanufacturing trade, we hold nonmanufacturing trade de…cits at their 2004 level. Since GDP is our numéraire we are keeping their share in world GDP …xed. We thus set for each country i:
where CA i is the 2004 current account surplus. We correspondingly set the new trade de…cit at:
Table III reports the actual and counterfactual trade de…cits both overall and in manufactures. Notice that the United States must run a surplus of two hundred billion dollars to balance its current account.
Formulation in Terms of Changes
As for T i ; i ; and d ni ; direct observations are hard to come by. Instead of attaching numbers to them, and to L i as well, we reformulate the model to express the equilibrating relationships in terms of aggregates of these parameters that are readily observable. We then solve for the proportional changes in wages and prices needed to eliminate current account de…cits. We use x 0 to denote the counterfactual value of variable x and b x to denote x 0 =x. We will repeatedly use the fact that factor payments correspond to value added, so that w
Starting with the equation for the average wage (2), we have
where the sectoral shares are s
The trade share equations (17) become
The price equations (18) become:
Finally, the sectoral share equation (19) becomes
To evaluate the case of immobile labor, Notice that the structure of the equations expressed as changes is well suited for considering the very short-run case in which we shut down the extensive margin. That analysis led to equations (13) and (14). Starting from a situation in which
the short-run case emerges by simply replacing with 1 in equations (22) and (23).
Computation
Simple iterative procedures solve equations (21) through (23) for changes in wages, employment, and prices, with equations (20), (24), (25), and (26) employed appropriately for the case at hand. 12 With 42 countries, a good quality laptop running GAUSS can deliver the solutions almost immediately. 13 In this algorithm, world GDP is the numéraire, hence:
For each of our 42 countries we present the change in a set of outcomes, presented as the ratio of the counterfactual value to its original value.
In the case of factor immobility, we present the change in manufacturing wage b w 
We can thus calculate the changes in real wages and real GDP.
Taking into account the static gain or loss of the transfers themselves, we get the change in real absorption in country i as
The counterfactual bilateral trade share of country i in n; ni ; can be constructed from the original shares using the expressions (22). The counterfactual bilateral trade ‡ow of n's imports from i is
Finally, the change in the share of manufacturing value added in GDP is
We now turn to the results.
Results
In discussing the results, we work backwards. Since it is conceptually simplest and relates to our earlier work, we start with the longest run in which both the allocation of labor and the extensive margin can adjust. We then look at a medium run in which labor is locked into its initial sector, but the extensive margin still operates. We conclude with the very short run in which neither margin can adjust: Labor is immobile and there is no change in the set of goods that countries buy from each other, only how much they buy. We report all results in terms of changes, so that if a variable changed from x to x 0 we report b x = x 0 =x: Table IV reports results for the mobile-factor case. With labor mobility, there is a single national wage whose change equals the change in GDP. The changes in wages are reported in the …rst column. As noted above they are calculated so that world GDP remains the same.
Labor Mobility
Note that relative wage changes are quite modest. The U.S. wage (and hence GDP) falls relative to Japan's by less than 8 percent. Because most goods aren't traded, price indices, reported in the second and third columns, move in the same direction as wages, resulting in changes to real wages (equivalently real GDP's), reported in the fourth column, nearly always a fraction of a percent.
In countries initially in de…cit, labor shifts from nonmanufacturing to manufacturing to pay o¤ the de…cit. The change in the manufacturing share is shown in the …fth column.
Note that the shifts can be substantial, with the share for the United States rising by over 22 percent (about 3 percentage points). The manufacturing sector in Japan declines by 8 percent.
The last column of Table IV To what extent could we have predicted the changes in wages (and GDP's) from the size of the current account surplus that had to be eliminated? Figure 1 plots the change in the wage reported in the …rst column of Table IV against the initial current account de…cit as a share of GDP (with country codes as listed in Table I ). Note that there is a de…nite negative relationship. Mexico and Canada are a bit below other countries with similar de…cits, re ‡ecting their proximity to the United States whose relative GDP has declined substantially. There is also a systematic positive relationship between the initial de…cit and the change in the size of the manufacturing sector. Figure 2 plots the change in the size of the manufacturing sector (column 5 of Table IV ) against the initial current account as a share of GDP.
Labor Immobility
Behind the mild price e¤ects of eliminating the de…cits just reported are big movements in labor across sectors. What if instead a worker is stuck in the sector where she is initially employed? The …rst two columns of Table V Except for Canada, the GDP changes are always in the same direction as in the case of mobile labor, but the magnitudes of the changes are much larger. The United States shrinks relative to Japan by 22 percent (as opposed to 8 percent in the previous case). Figure 3 plots the change in GDP against the initial current account de…cit as a share of GDP, using the same scale as Figure 1 . Note that the relationship is again negative and about twice as steep as in the case of labor mobility. Hence eliminating countries'ability to reallocate resources requires substantially more adjustment in relative GDP's.
Nearly as systematic is the tendency of the wage in manufacturing relative to nonmanufacturing to rise in countries initially in de…cit with the opposite in surplus countries. In the United States, the relative wage in manufacturing rises by around 29 percent. The change for Australia, another large de…cit country, is nearly as large. In Japan and Germany, the largest surplus countries, the relative wage of manufacturing workers declines by around 9 to 11 percent. Looking across countries, changes in nonmanufacturing wages contribute much more to changes in relative GDP. Figure 4 plots the change in the manufacturing share against the initial current account de…cit as a share of GDP. Note the systematically positive relationship.
Because of the pervasiveness of nontradedness, both the price index of manufactures (reported in the fourth column of Although aggregate changes are small, the redistributional e¤ects are substantial. Col-umn 1 of Table VI shows real gains to labor in the manufacturing sector in countries that are initially in de…cit. In the United States, the real wage in manufacturing rises by 24 percent but declines by 4 percent outside manufacturing. In Japan, the real manufacturing wage declines by 9 percent with a 2 percent gain in nonmanufacturing. In every country the real wage moves in opposite directions in the two sectors.
No Extensive Margin
Sticking with a situation of labor immobility, we now take the further step of eliminating the extensive margin of adjustment. We interpret this case as applying to the very short run. Implementing this case amounts to replacing with 1 in our solution algorithm described above. As mentioned, we follow Ruhl (2005) in setting = 2:0. There are thus two interpretations of what we are doing in this case. One is that the parameter = 8:28 is as above, but with no adjustment on the extensive margin, the parameter = 2 becomes the relevant one governing adjustment. Another interpretation is that we are simply repeating the immobile labor case, now using the much lower value of = 1.
The results are shown in Tables VII and VIII. Focussing on relative GDP changes (in column 3 of Table VII) , we see that they are magni…ed considerably when the extensive margin is inoperable. U.S. GDP falls by about 30 percent, while Japan's rises by 26 percent relative to the world. Figure 5 plots the change in GDP against the initial de…cit as a share of GDP, again using the same scale as Figure 1 . Note that the relationship has become twice as steep again as that portrayed in Figure 3 . Note also that U.S. neighbors Canada and Mexico have fallen further below the rest.
As in the previous case, most of the GDP adjustment occurs through the nonmanufacturing wage. Figure 6 plots the change in the manufacturing share against the initial current account de…cit. It looks very similar to Figure 4 .
Again, prices tend to move in line with relative GDP, so that changes in real GDP are small, but substantially larger than in the previous case. Note that U.S. real GDP falls by about 2 percent, about a third of the initial de…cit. Hence with a very low response of trade shares to costs, a nontrivial secondary burden appears.
Qualitatively the consequences of adjustment for real wages are much as in the previous case, with the manufacturing real wage rising in de…cit countries and falling in surplus countries. For the United States, at least, the burden of the inability to adjust at the extensive margin is born by workers outside manufacturing. The increase in the manufacturing real wage is as in the previous case, but the decline in the nonmanufacturing wage is greater.
Conclusion
We have revisited the question of the secondary burden of transfers using a forty-two country gravity model of international production and trade in manufactures. Our motivation is to assess the implications for relative wages, relative GDP's, real wages, and real absorption in the major countries of the world should the current transfers implied by existing current account de…cits come to a halt. How much relative GDP's need to change depends on ‡exibility of two forms, factor mobility between manufacturing and nonmanufacturing and the ability of trade to adjust at the extensive margin. With perfect mobility and an active extensive margin the GDP of the United States (running the largest de…cit) must fall about 8 percent relative to that of Japan (running the largest surplus). Without mobility, however, the decline is 22 percent. If there is no adjustment in supplier sourcing (the extensive margin) either, the decline is 44 percent.
Because of the pervasiveness of nontraded goods, however, prices move largely in sync with relative GDP's so that aggregate real changes are much more muted. Regardless of the degree of labor mobility, the decline in U.S. real GDP is only 0.4 percent if the extensive margin is operative. Without an extensive margin, the drop rises to 2 percent of GDP. So only with extreme in ‡exibility does a secondary burden of eliminating the transfer inherent in the U.S. current account de…cit show up.
While the overall real e¤ects are small, with factor immobility redistributional e¤ects are substantial. Regardless of whether the extensive margin is operative, eliminating current account de…cits leads to a rise in the U.S. wage in manufactures relative to nonmanufactures of around 30 percent, re ‡ecting a 24 percent real increase for manufacturing workers and a decline of around 5 percent for nonmanufacturing workers. In the long run in which labor is mobile, this wage di¤erence induces an increase in the manufacturing share of employment of 23 percent. 34 Vmfg is value added in manufacturing, Ymfg is gross production in manufacturing, beta is the share of value added in gross production, and alpha is the share of manufactures in final absorption. 
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